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type, title, description, jurisdiction, legislature, session, identifier, citation, classification, subjects, status, primary_sponsors, version_count, action_count, vote_count, first_action, last_action, source, source_identifier, source_url, source_hash, vintage, source_snapshot, retrieved_at, confidence, tags
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| Bill | AN ACT TO AMEND TITLE 8 OF THE DELAWARE CODE RELATING TO THE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW. | Section 1 of this Act amends § 144 of Title 8 to provide safe harbor procedures for acts or transactions in which one or more directors or officers as well as controlling stockholders and members of control groups have interests or relationships that might render them interested or not independent with respect to the act or transaction. Under revised § 144(a), certain acts or transactions involving such directors or officers will be protected if approved or recommended by a majority of the disinterested directors, either serving on a board of directors or a committee of the board of directors, or approved or ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the disinterested stockholders entitled to vote thereon, in each case upon disclosure or in full knowledge of the material facts giving rise to the conflict or potential conflict. If a majority of the directors are not disinterested directors with respect to the act or transaction, any such disinterested director approval or recommendation must be provided through a disinterested director committee. In addition, the amendments define what parties constitute a controlling stockholder or control group and provide safe harbor procedures that can be followed to insulate from challenge specified acts or transactions from which a controlling stockholder or control group receives a unique benefit. Under new § 144(b), a controlling stockholder transaction that does not constitute a “going private transaction” may be entitled to the statutory safe harbor protection if it is negotiated and approved or recommended, as applicable, by a majority of the disinterested directors then serving on the committee, or is conditioned on the approval or ratification by disinterested stockholders and is approved or ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the disinterested stockholders. Under new § 144(c), a controlling stockholder transaction that constitutes a “going private transaction” may be entitled to the statutory safe harbor protection if it is negotiated and approved or recommended, as applicable, by a majority of the disinterested directors then serving on the committee and is conditioned on the approval of or ratification by disinterested stockholders and is approved or ratified by a vote of a majority of the votes cast by the disinterested stockholders. With respect to any approval or recommendation by a committee, the safe harbor only applies if the act or transaction or controlling stockholder transaction, as applicable, was approved by a committee consisting of at least 2 directors, all of whom, in the first instance, have been determined by the board of directors to be disinterested directors. Revised § 144 provides that any approval or recommendation, as applicable, of disinterested directors or a disinterested director committee must be made in good faith and without gross negligence, making clear that the statute does not displace the common law requirements regarding core fiduciary conduct as contemplated by cases such as Flood v. Synutra International, Inc., 195 A.3d 754 (Del. 2018), and In re MFW Shareholders Litigation, 67 A.3d 496 (Del. Ch. 2013), aff'd sub nom., Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del.2014). Revised § 144 does not limit the right of any person to seek relief on the grounds that a stockholder or other person aided and abetted a breach of fiduciary duty by one or more directors. Consistent with existing case law, the stockholder or other person must have knowingly participated in a breach of fiduciary duty to establish an aiding and abetting claim. In re Mindbody, Inc., 2024 WL 4926910 (Del. Dec. 2, 2024). The amendments to § 144 also set forth criteria for determining the independence and disinterestedness of directors and stockholders. The amendments provide that controlling stockholders and control groups, in their capacity as such, cannot be liable for monetary damages for breach of the duty of care. | us/states/de | Delaware General Assembly | 153 | SB 21 | Delaware SB 21 (153) |
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enacted |
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0 | 16 | 2 | 2025-03-12 | 2025-03-25 | openstates | ocd-bill/50f33d31-2e39-4826-920e-d3c82b2312bb | https://legis.delaware.gov/BillDetail?LegislationId=141930 | f10189da9e1b4f667b5e50c2d86b042e05599f92b4c3cf221ab552fcc5c53764 | 2026-07-01 | https://data.openstates.org/daily/2026-07-01/public.pgdump | 2026-07-06 | reported |
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Delaware SB 21 (153) — AN ACT TO AMEND TITLE 8 OF THE DELAWARE CODE RELATING TO THE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW.
Section 1 of this Act amends § 144 of Title 8 to provide safe harbor procedures for acts or transactions in which one or more directors or officers as well as controlling stockholders and members of control groups have interests or relationships that might render them interested or not independent with respect to the act or transaction. Under revised § 144(a), certain acts or transactions involving such directors or officers will be protected if approved or recommended by a majority of the disinterested directors, either serving on a board of directors or a committee of the board of directors, or approved or ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the disinterested stockholders entitled to vote thereon, in each case upon disclosure or in full knowledge of the material facts giving rise to the conflict or potential conflict. If a majority of the directors are not disinterested directors with respect to the act or transaction, any such disinterested director approval or recommendation must be provided through a disinterested director committee. In addition, the amendments define what parties constitute a controlling stockholder or control group and provide safe harbor procedures that can be followed to insulate from challenge specified acts or transactions from which a controlling stockholder or control group receives a unique benefit. Under new § 144(b), a controlling stockholder transaction that does not constitute a “going private transaction” may be entitled to the statutory safe harbor protection if it is negotiated and approved or recommended, as applicable, by a majority of the disinterested directors then serving on the committee, or is conditioned on the approval or ratification by disinterested stockholders and is approved or ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the disinterested stockholders. Under new § 144(c), a controlling stockholder transaction that constitutes a “going private transaction” may be entitled to the statutory safe harbor protection if it is negotiated and approved or recommended, as applicable, by a majority of the disinterested directors then serving on the committee and is conditioned on the approval of or ratification by disinterested stockholders and is approved or ratified by a vote of a majority of the votes cast by the disinterested stockholders. With respect to any approval or recommendation by a committee, the safe harbor only applies if the act or transaction or controlling stockholder transaction, as applicable, was approved by a committee consisting of at least 2 directors, all of whom, in the first instance, have been determined by the board of directors to be disinterested directors. Revised § 144 provides that any approval or recommendation, as applicable, of disinterested directors or a disinterested director committee must be made in good faith and without gross negligence, making clear that the statute does not displace the common law requirements regarding core fiduciary conduct as contemplated by cases such as Flood v. Synutra International, Inc., 195 A.3d 754 (Del. 2018), and In re MFW Shareholders Litigation, 67 A.3d 496 (Del. Ch. 2013), aff'd sub nom., Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del.2014). Revised § 144 does not limit the right of any person to seek relief on the grounds that a stockholder or other person aided and abetted a breach of fiduciary duty by one or more directors. Consistent with existing case law, the stockholder or other person must have knowingly participated in a breach of fiduciary duty to establish an aiding and abetting claim. In re Mindbody, Inc., 2024 WL 4926910 (Del. Dec. 2, 2024). The amendments to § 144 also set forth criteria for determining the independence and disinterestedness of directors and stockholders. The amendments provide that controlling stockholders and control groups, in their capacity as such, cannot be liable for monetary damages for breach of the duty of care.
Version chain
The bill's text revisions, in order — the diff chain from filing to enrollment.
Votes
- 2/3 — 20–0 (pass) · upper
- 2/3 — 32–7 (pass) · lower
Sponsors
- Brian Pettyjohn — primary (person)
- Bryan Townsend — primary (person)
- David P. Sokola — primary (person)
- Edward S. Osienski — primary (person)
- Josue O Ortega — primary (person)
- Kerri Evelyn Harris — primary (person)
- Nicole Poore — primary (person)
- Ray Seigfried — primary (person)
- Russell Huxtable — primary (person)
- Stell Parker Selby — primary (person)
- Timothy D. Dukes — primary (person)
- Trey Paradee — primary (person)
Timeline
The legislative action history — every referral, reading, and vote.
- 2025-03-12 Adopted in lieu of the original bill SB 21, and Assigned to Judiciary Committee in Senate
introduction, referral-committee - 2025-03-12 Reported Out of Committee (Judiciary) in Senate with 2 Favorable, 2 On Its Merits
committee-passage, committee-passage-favorable - 2025-03-13 Passed By Senate. Votes: 20 YES 1 ABSENT
passage - 2025-03-13 Assigned to Judiciary Committee in House
introduction, referral-committee - 2025-03-18 Amendment HA 1 to SS 1 - Introduced and Placed With Bill
amendment-introduction - 2025-03-19 Reported Out of Committee (Judiciary) in House with 9 On Its Merits
committee-passage - 2025-03-25 Amendment HA 2 to SS 1 - Introduced and Placed With Bill
amendment-introduction - 2025-03-25 Amendment HA 1 to SS 1 - Stricken in House
- 2025-03-25 Amendment HA 2 to SS 1 - Defeated By House. Votes: 6 YES 32 NO 1 NOT VOTING 2 ABSENT
amendment-failure - 2025-03-25 Amendment HA 3 to SS 1 - Defeated By House. Votes: 9 YES 30 NO 2 ABSENT
amendment-failure - 2025-03-25 Amendment HA 4 to SS 1 - Defeated By House. Votes: 8 YES 31 NO 2 ABSENT
amendment-failure - 2025-03-25 Amendment HA 5 to SS 1 - Defeated By House. Votes: 8 YES 31 NO 2 ABSENT
amendment-failure - 2025-03-25 Amendment HA 6 to SS 1 - Stricken in House
- 2025-03-25 Amendment HA 7 to SS 1 - Defeated By House. Votes: 8 YES 31 NO 2 ABSENT
amendment-failure - 2025-03-25 Passed By House. Votes: 32 YES 7 NO 2 ABSENT
passage - 2025-03-25 Signed by Governor
executive-signature
Source
OpenStates / OpenCivicData bulk snapshot 2026-07-01; origin ocd-bill/50f33d31-2e39-4826-920e-d3c82b2312bb. Confidence: reported (aggregated from official Delaware legislature records).