Fabio
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Ingested titles 12–51 and 54 from OLRC USLM XML @119-100 (the whole Code now, uniform edition; Title 53 is reserved/empty). LegalText 11,221 -> 59,740; repo total 105,704 records. Deterministic (byte-identical rerun, verified on Title 42's 8,356 sections); make check green. make legal-us-code default now covers every title. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
68 lines
4.2 KiB
Markdown
68 lines
4.2 KiB
Markdown
---
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type: "LegalText"
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title: "22 U.S.C. § 9752"
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description: "Concerns over PDVSA transactions with Rosneft"
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jurisdiction: "us"
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corpus: "united_states_code"
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kind: "code_section"
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title_number: 22
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title_name: "FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE"
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chapter_number: "104"
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chapter_name: "VENEZUELA ASSISTANCE"
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section: "9752"
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citation: "22 U.S.C. § 9752"
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status: "current"
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release_point: "119-100"
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release_date: "2026-06-26"
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source: "official"
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source_url: "https://uscode.house.gov/download/releasepoints/us/pl/119/100/xml_usc22@119-100.zip"
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source_identifier: "/us/usc/t22/s9752"
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source_file: "data/legal/raw/us/code/title-22/usc22.xml"
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source_hash: "a15e8dae5537b8d06e51cd1b55be29aaf0705f5b98e990d09b79d0d5f8664b2f"
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raw_snapshot_hash: "b9c63ede722f5e0bf8eabfe9029e06e312ab9bcfd95c4d1424ed515baff1df83"
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text_hash: "f1f3e32542fbaa8b93eb3bb4118098f61d1852c56cd3087b8c690e2bf9eea415"
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retrieved_at: "2026-07-04"
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confidence: "official"
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tags: ["legal", "us-code"]
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---
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# 22 U.S.C. § 9752 - Concerns over PDVSA transactions with Rosneft
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## Text
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(a) Findings Congress makes the following findings:
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(1) In late 2016, Venezuelan state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (referred to in this section as “PDVSA”), through a no compete transaction, secured a loan from Russian government-controlled oil company Rosneft, using 49.9 percent of PDVSA’s American subsidiary, CITGO Petroleum Corporation, including its assets in the United States, as collateral. As a result of this transaction, 100 percent of CITGO is held as collateral by PDVSA’s creditors.
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(2) CITGO, a wholly owned subsidiary of PDVSA, is engaged in interstate commerce and owns and controls critical energy infrastructure in 19 States of the United States, including an extensive network of pipelines, 48 terminals, and 3 refineries, with a combined oil refining capacity of 749,000 barrels per day. CITGO’s refinery in Lake Charles, Louisiana, is the sixth largest refinery in the United States.
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(3) The Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on Rosneft, which is controlled by the Government of the Russian Federation, and its Executive Chairman, Igor Sechin, following Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine and its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014.
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(4) The Department of Homeland Security has designated the energy sector as critical to United States infrastructure.
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(5) The growing economic crisis in Venezuela raises the probability that the Maduro regime and PDVSA will default on their international debt obligations, resulting in a scenario in which Rosneft could come into control of CITGO’s United States energy infrastructure holdings.
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(b) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that—
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(1) control of critical United States energy infrastructure by Rosneft, a Russian government-controlled entity currently under United States sanctions that is led by Igor Sechin, who is also under United States sanctions and is a close associate of Vladimir Putin, would pose a significant risk to United States national security and energy security; and
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(2) a default by PDVSA on its loan from Rosneft, resulting in Rosneft coming into possession of PDVSA’s United States CITGO assets, would warrant careful consideration by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States.
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(c) Preventing Rosneft from controlling United States energy infrastructure The President shall take all necessary steps to prevent Rosneft from gaining control of critical United States energy infrastructure.
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(d) Security risk report Not later than 90 days after December 20, 2019, the President shall submit a report assessing the national security risks posed by potential Russian acquisition and control of CITGO’s United States energy infrastructure holdings to—
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(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
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(2) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate;
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(3) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate;
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(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
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(5) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives; and
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(6) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.
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(Pub. L. 116–94, div. J, title I, § 163, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 3041.)
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