Fabio
76b8ec33a7
Ingested titles 12–51 and 54 from OLRC USLM XML @119-100 (the whole Code now, uniform edition; Title 53 is reserved/empty). LegalText 11,221 -> 59,740; repo total 105,704 records. Deterministic (byte-identical rerun, verified on Title 42's 8,356 sections); make check green. make legal-us-code default now covers every title. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
56 lines
3.3 KiB
Markdown
56 lines
3.3 KiB
Markdown
---
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type: "LegalText"
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title: "22 U.S.C. § 3361"
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description: "Strategy to respond to influence and information operations targeting Taiwan"
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jurisdiction: "us"
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corpus: "united_states_code"
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kind: "code_section"
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title_number: 22
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title_name: "FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE"
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chapter_number: "48A"
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chapter_name: "TAIWAN ENHANCED RESILIENCE"
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section: "3361"
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citation: "22 U.S.C. § 3361"
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status: "current"
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release_point: "119-100"
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release_date: "2026-06-26"
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source: "official"
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source_url: "https://uscode.house.gov/download/releasepoints/us/pl/119/100/xml_usc22@119-100.zip"
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source_identifier: "/us/usc/t22/s3361"
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source_file: "data/legal/raw/us/code/title-22/usc22.xml"
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source_hash: "b5942abbdd987b964a8a35b999b77bccae0c49edb210993bf2ca73f02ca4d391"
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raw_snapshot_hash: "b9c63ede722f5e0bf8eabfe9029e06e312ab9bcfd95c4d1424ed515baff1df83"
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text_hash: "54e24a429bd5f4382a2a2aa0a641863ef332de901c1c1b9601d401f8069f7136"
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retrieved_at: "2026-07-04"
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confidence: "official"
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tags: ["legal", "us-code"]
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---
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# 22 U.S.C. § 3361 - Strategy to respond to influence and information operations targeting Taiwan
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## Text
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(a) In general Not later than 180 days after December 23, 2022, and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall develop and implement a strategy to respond to—
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(1) covert, coercive, and corrupting activities carried out to advance the Chinese Communist Party’s “United Front” work related to Taiwan, including activities directed, coordinated, or otherwise supported by the United Front Work Department or its subordinate or affiliated entities; and
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(2) information and disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, and nontraditional propaganda measures supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party that are directed toward persons or entities in Taiwan.
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(b) Elements The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include descriptions of—
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(1) the proposed response to propaganda and disinformation campaigns by the People’s Republic of China and cyber-intrusions targeting Taiwan, including—
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(A) assistance in building the capacity of Taiwan’s public and private-sector entities to document and expose propaganda and disinformation supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party, or affiliated entities;
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(B) assistance to enhance Taiwan’s ability to develop a holistic strategy to respond to sharp power operations, including election interference; and
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(C) media training for Taiwan officials and other Taiwan entities targeted by disinformation campaigns;
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(2) the proposed response to political influence operations that includes an assessment of the extent of influence exerted by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party in Taiwan on local political parties, financial institutions, media organizations, and other entities;
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(3) support for exchanges and other technical assistance to strengthen the Taiwan legal system’s ability to respond to sharp power operations; and
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(4) programs carried out by the Global Engagement Center to expose misinformation and disinformation in the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda.
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(Pub. L. 117–263, div. E, title LV, § 5513, Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 3309.)
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